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When Silence Means Everything:
The Application of Proposition 64 to
Pending Actions
GAVIN L. CHARLSTON*
Silence can be full of meaning.'
INTRODUCTION
Prior to November 3, 2004, one of the most expansive unfair
competition laws in the country was on the books in California.2 Unlike
most states, where plaintiffs are barred from bringing unfair competition
claims unless they have suffered an injury-in-fact (or barred altogether
from bringing such an action), in California any individual could bring an
action where the defendant had engaged in a broad class of violations
known as "unfair business practices."3 While a fair number of legitimate
lawsuits were brought under that iteration of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"),4 far more time and money were spent on
actions brought by plaintiffs who had suffered no cognizable injury. On
November 2, 2004, the California electorate voted to end that practice by
enacting Proposition 64.' Now private plaintiffs must not only prove that
they have suffered an injury-in-fact and some form of pecuniary loss, but
* J.D. Candidate, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2007; B.A., University of California, Santa
Barbara, 2004. A special thanks to Professor David Levine, Chris Lockard, Jenni Khuu, and Kathy
Kizer for their guidance and assistance; my family and fiancee, Christina, for their love and support;
and the entire staff of the Hastings Law Journal for all of their hard work. All errors are my own.
I. J.M. COETZEE, SLOW MAN 225 (2005).
2. Gail Lees, Editorial, Where's the Relief?, RECORDER, June 21, 2o00; see James R. McCall et al.,
Greater Representation for California Consumers-Fluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds, and
Representative Actions, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 797, 812-13 0995)"
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (Deering 1993) (amended 2004).
4. Richard Holober, Editorial, An Opposing View: Prop. 64. Protect Consumers and Fight
Pollution-No on Prop. 64, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2004, at B9.
5. Carolyn Said, Proposition 64: Citizens' Right to Sue Limited, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2004, at CI.
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they must also satisfy new procedural requirements in order to bring an
action in the first place.6
Without question, the intent of the initiative's drafters was clear with
respect to who could bring UCL actions in the future.7 What was not so
clear, and in fact what was not addressed at all, was whether the
amendments to the UCL contained in Proposition 64 applied to actions
pending at the time of its passage. The result was a question left for the
courts to answer, and slowly but surely cases began percolating in the
trial courts, before appellate panels, and in front of the California
Supreme Court.
This Note explores the diverging viewpoints on whether the
amendments to the UCL enacted by the passage of Proposition 64 apply
to all pending actions, or only to actions brought after Proposition 64's
effective date. It also assesses recent California Supreme Court decisions
related to that divergence. The goal is to determine whether the
6. The Findings and Declarations of Purpose of Proposition 64 read as follows:
The people of the State of California find and declare that:
(a) This state's unfair competition laws set forth in Sections 172OO and 17500 of the
Business and Professions Code are intended to protect California businesses and
consumers from unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices.
(b) These unfair competition laws are being misused by some private attorneys who:
(I) File frivolous lawsuits as a means of generating attorney's fees without
creating a corresponding public benefit.
(2) File lawsuits where no client has been injured in fact.
(3) File lawsuits for clients who have not used the defendant's product or service,
viewed the defendant's advertising, or had any other business dealing with the
defendant.
(4) File lawsuits on behalf of the general public without any accountability to the
public and without adequate court supervision.
(c) Frivolous unfair competition lawsuits clog our courts and cost taxpayers. Such
lawsuits cost California jobs and economic prosperity, threatening the survival of small
businesses and forcing businesses to raise their prices or to lay off employees to pay
lawsuit settlement costs or to relocate to states that do not permit such lawsuits.
(d) It is the intent of California voters in enacting this act to eliminate frivolous unfair
competition lawsuits while protecting the right of individuals to retain an attorney and
file an action for relief pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of
Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.
(e) It is the intent of the California voters in enacting this act to prohibit private
attorneys from filing lawsuits for unfair competition where they have no client who has
been injured in fact under the standing requirements of the United States Constitution.
(f) It is the intent of California voters in enacting this act that only the California
Attorney General and local public officials be authorized to file and prosecute actions
on behalf of the general public.
(g) It is the intent of California voters in enacting this act that the Attorney General,
district attorneys, county counsels, and city attorneys maintain their public protection
authority and capability under the unfair competition laws.
CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, PROPOSITION 64 § 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/electionsbp-novo4/prop-64-text-of-proposed-law.pdf.
7. See id. § I(d)-(g).
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California Supreme Court was correct in concluding that Proposition 64
applies to pending actions. Part I explores the historical framework of
California's UCL, the history leading up to the passage of Proposition 64,
and the contents and effects of the initiative. Part II details the two cases
heard by the California Supreme Court and examines the issues
presented before the Court. Part III studies the divergent arguments
both in support of and against applying Proposition 64 to pending
actions. It also explores a related issue: the California Supreme Court's
perspective on whether and under what circumstances plaintiffs may
amend their complaints to satisfy the newly-enacted procedural and
standing requirements. The Note concludes by finding that, based on the
contents of and the circumstances surrounding the passage of
Proposition 64, the California Supreme Court correctly concluded that
the initiative applies to pending actions.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF CALIFORNIA'S UCL
Initially employed as a mechanism to prosecute secondary trade
name infringement," unfair competition actions evolved into a boon for
plaintiffs' lawyers during the latter part of the twentieth century.9 While
there undoubtedly were a number of legitimate actions successfully
prosecuted by private plaintiffs, many more were considerably suspect.'"
As actions were brought for increasingly specious claims, ranging from
suits brought against the maker of Pok6mon cards alleging they
promoted child gambling," to those brought against the makers of
certain sugared cereals alleging they should be labeled as "candy
breakfasts,"'" industry groups whose members were suffering the brunt of
these claims became increasingly agitated, referring to section 17200 as a
"shakedown statute."'3 Numerous legislative proposals to remedy this
issue floundered, 4 but finally a group touting itself as "Californians to
8. Wesley J. Howard, Note, Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial Interpretation.
30 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 707 (1979); see infra note 17.
9. Sheila Muto, Unfair Competition Law Faces High-Court Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at
CAi.
io. To be fair, a number of actions brought by plaintiffs who would have otherwise lacked
standing were meritorious. For example, consumers in 199o brought suit against Safeway to enjoin it
from re-labeling expired meat: environmentalists in 1999 successfully sued Crystal Geyser to reduce
harmful levels of contaminants in its bottled water; and non-profit organizations were often successful
in bringing suits to protect consumers. Holober, supra note 4. As amended, the UCL still permits such
actions to be brought by the California Attorney General and local public officials. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17203 (Deering 2006).
i i. See John H. Sullivan, Call it Gonzo Law: The Unfair Competition Statute Covers Any Claim, if
it's Presented with a Straight Face, CAL. L. Bus., Jan. IO, 2000, at 22, available at
http://www.cjac.org/legislation/bp172oo/gonzo.html.
12. Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 664 n.3 (Cal. 1983).
13. Bernadette Tansey, Battle Brews Over Consumer Protection in State, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 28,
2003, at I i.
14. See, e.g., Jeff Chorney, Schwarzenegger Seems Ready to Deal on 172oo Fix, RECORDER, Jan. 30,
February 20071
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Stop Shakedown Lawsuits" submitted enough signatures to the
California Secretary of State to put a measure, later known as
Proposition 64, on the November 2004 ballot. 5
A. CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION STATUTE
California's first unfair competition law was passed in 1872 "as a
vehicle for businesses to sue competitors that were gaining an unfair
market advantage through an illegal or unscrupulous practice.' 6 Most
actions brought under the law were initiated by companies harmed by
name infringement.'7 In the 1930s, the law was revised and recodified as
California Civil Code § 3369.' 8 Modifications included the creation of a
"public right of action, enforceable in equity, to enjoin unfair business
competition.""' Despite this arguably expansive language, California
courts continued to limit the application of section 3369 to secondary
name infringement actions for another twenty-four years.20 The statute
was amended in 1963," however, and in the 1970s the California
Supreme Court adopted the plain meaning of the statute as its
interpretation of the law, finally putting an end to the limited and narrow
understanding of section 3369.2" The Court later noted that "the primary
purpose of these statutes was to 'extend[ ] to the entire consuming public
the protection once afforded only to business competitors.' 2 3 Section
3369 was subsequently recodified as California Business & Professions
Code §§ 1720O-172o5 in 1977 . "
There are three potential bases for a UCL action, and the statute
operates disjunctively, requiring the violation of only one of the elements
in order to give rise to a cause of action. The first creates a cause of
action for any unlawful business act or practice, the second prohibits
unfair business acts or practices, and the third proscribes fraudulent
2004, at i. The bill discussed was subsequently proposed as AB 2604, but did not make it very far. See
Jeff Chorney, i7200 Talks Over, Ballot Fight Now Seems Imminent, RECORDER, Apr. 7, 2004, at I; see
also infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
15. Initiative Would Require Clients for Public Suits. VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Apr. t3, 2004, at 2.
i6. Tansey, supra note 13.
17. Howard, supra note 8, at 707. Specifically, parties unable to obtain relief by other methods
could bring an action for secondary name infringement; where a plaintiffs trade name had developed
a "positive association" with the goods being sold, they were entitled to injunctive relief when that
name was subsequently used by a competitor. Id.
i8. 1933 Cal. Stat. 2482.
19. Sharon J. Arkin, The Effective Use of California's Unfair Competition Law to Redress
Managed Care Abuses, 22 WHrTIER L. REV. 467, 468 (2000).
20. See, e.g., Hesse v. Grossman, 313 P.2d 625, 628 (Cal. 1957); Howard, supra note 8, at 712.
21. 1963 Cal. Stat. 3184.
22. Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass'n of Oakland, 496 P.2d 817,829 (Cal. 1972).
23. Bank of the W. v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Barquis, 496 P.2d at
828).
24. McCall et al., supra note 2, at 812-13.
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business acts and practices.25 Standing alone, the statute creates a broad
enforcement tool designed to protect consumers. It has been used to this
effect in a number of cases, primarily in circumstances where the plaintiff
has suffered a legitimate injury, or where the attorney general brought
suit on behalf of consumers.
Proposition 64 was not designed to address the substantive aspects
of the law, but instead the UCL's extraordinarily permissive standing
provisions. 6 In a study conducted in 1995, researchers found that of the
sixteen states with unfair competition laws, only California did not
require an actual injury to the plaintiffs. 7 The statute specifically
provided that "'any person acting for the interests of itself, its members
or the general public"' could bring a claim.s UCL plaintiffs thus ranged
from business disputants who included a UCL claim with a preexisting
cause of action, to individuals whose sole claim of injury was the fact that
the defendant was misleading the public. 9 The statute did not require
plaintiffs to have suffered any personal harm or to have any stake in the
litigation in order bring an action under the UCL. 0 While some
beneficial actions were brought by private citizens under the UCL, such
permissive standing requirements also resulted in the rise of professional
plaintiffs, who oftentimes filed multiple, questionable actions solely for
the remunerative gain of a quick settlement.'
B. PROPOSITION 64
Despite the potential for abuse, legislative attempts to close this
standing loophole stalled repeatedly. One author referred to the UCL as
a "legal tar baby" ("everyone who takes a swing at it gets stuck"), citing
the numerous failed attempts to legislatively amend the UCL.32 More
than fifteen bills were introduced to reform the UCL in 2003 and 2004;
only a few made it out of committee, and none were successful.33 Interest
25. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17205 (Deering 1993) (portions amended 2004).
26. See id. § 17204.
27. Robert C. Fellmeth, California's Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and Confusions, 26 L.
REV. COMM. REP. 227, 247-48 (I996), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKST-
Fellmeth.pdf.
28. Id. at 276 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (Deering 1993)).
29. Sullivan, supra note i i, at 22.
30. See People v. Cappuccio, Inc., 251 Cal. Rptr. 657,662-63 (Ct. App. 1988).
31. David M. Axelrad et al., California's "Little FTC Act": Benefiting Consumers, or Lawyers?,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 4, 1998, at 3. One often publicized UCL story was that of the Trevor Law
Group, a firm in Beverly Hills that brought hundreds of UCL actions after gleaning information about
a defendant's business practices from the Internet. Terry Carter, Bottom Feeders, 90 A.B.A. J. 37, 37
(2004). Other UCL plaintiffs included individuals who brought hundreds of suits against businesses
that the plaintiff claimed had failed to provide adequate disability access. Jim Welte, Tiburon Attorney
Fights for Practice, MARIN INDEP. J., Apr. 3, 2005.
32. Thomas Brom, Full Disclosure, CAL. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 33.
33. For a discussion of some of the legislative measures and other attempts to reform the UCL,
see Tansey, supra note 13. One can imagine that the conflicting interests of the general public and
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groups representing companies suffering the brunt of these more
specious claims finally realized that traditional legislation would not
survive the political process in Sacramento, and turned instead to the
electorate.
In late 2003, a coalition known as "Californians to Stop Shakedown
Lawsuits, 34 placed an initiative on the ballot to curtail abuses of the
UCL.35 The proposition sought to amend the UCL so that private
enforcement actions could be brought only by individuals who are
"actually injured by, and suffer[ ] financial/property loss because of, an
unfair business practice." 6 Claimants would also have to comply with
certain procedural requirements when bringing class action suits, and the
power to bring actions on behalf of the general public would be limited
to the Attorney General.37
In the run-up to the 2004 election, business groups supporting
Proposition 64 were pitted aiainst consumer advocacy groups doing their
best to force a compromise.3 Governor Schwarzenegger lent his support
to Proposition 64, stating in a press release that the unreformed UCL
"turns lawyers into bounty hunters" and that passage of the initiative
would aid in making California more business friendly.39 Supporters of
the initiative, including Microsoft, State Farm Insurance, and a number
of business interest groups, cited attorney abuse of the UCL as another
reason to support of the passage of Proposition 64 . ' Opponents of the
proposition faced an uphill battle as its supporters raised millions of
dollars for their campaign.
4'
Proposition 64 passed with nearly sixty percent of the vote in the
November 2004 election.4 Like all California initiatives that lack an
operative date, it went into effect the next day.43 With respect to who
wealthy companies (and campaign donors) might have been a partial cause of the stalemate.
34. The coalition included a number of litigation reform and business interest groups, including
the Civil Justice Association of California, the California Chamber of Commerce, and the California
Motor Car Dealers Association. Brom, supra note 32.
35. Initiative Would Require Clients for Public Suits, supra note 15.
36. CAL. ATr'v GEN., OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY OF PRoPosrnoN 64, http://vote2oo4.ss.ca.gov/
voterguide/propositions/prop64-title.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
37. Id.
38. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
39. James Ramage, Schwarzenegger Says Help is on Way, VICrORVILLE DAILY NEWS, May 5, 2004;
Press Release, Governor Schwarzenegger's California Recovery Team, Governor Schwarzenegger
Takes Positions on November Ballot Measures Affecting California's Recovery (Sept. 1o, 2004) (on
file with author).
40. See John Wildermuth, Measure Would Limit Public Interest Suits, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 2004,
at Bi; see also Lucia Hwang, The Rise and Fall of the Trevor Law Group, CAL. LAW., July 2004, at 17,
17; supra note 14.
41. Jill Duman, Cash Pours in for t72oo Fight: Businesses Cough up $7.6 Million, RECORDER, June
18, 2004, at i.
42. Said, supra note 5.
43. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § Io(a).
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could bring UCL claims, the amendments resulted in a much more
restrictive law:
[The UCL] has been amended to prohibit any person, other than the
state Attorney General or a local public prosecutor, from bringing an
unfair competition action unless the plaintiff has suffered injury-in-fact
and has lost money or property. The authority of a person to file suit
on behalf of the general public absent injury-in-fact and loss of money
or property has been abrogated."
Courts were thereafter faced with a quandary. Plaintiffs who had not
suffered an injury-in-fact were no longer able to bring a claim under the
UCL, but there were a number of UCL actions already pending before
courts throughout the state. The text of the initiative was silent with
respect to those actions. Thus, while the substantive interpretation of the
amended UCL has not been subject to much dispute since the passage of
Proposition 64, the issue of how it should be applied has consumed much
legal attention.45
II. APPLICATION OF PROPOSITION 64 TO PENDING MATTERS
Within days of its passage, members of the bar began disputing
whether Proposition 64 would apply to those pending cases,46 and judges
reached a number of different conclusions. 4' For instance, one week after
the passage of Proposition 64, a trial court in Sacramento ruled that the
initiative lacked language indicating that it applied to pending matters,
concludin that it did not apply to actions filed before the passage of the
initiative.a A few days later, a trial court in Los Angeles, applying
44. United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 389 (Ct. App.
2005).
45. It is close to impossible to detect the number of trial court decisions related to this issue.
However, a number of courts of appeal weighed in on the matter prior to the California Supreme
Court's decisions in the summer of 2006. See, e.g., Bivens v. Gallery Corp., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 541, 547-50
(Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 130 P.3d 518 (Cal. 2006); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 36
Cal. Rptr. 3 d 279, 281-85 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 129 P.3 d 879 (Cal. 2006); Schwartz v. Visa
Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 452-58 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 125 P.3 d 290 (Cal.
2005); Consumer Advocacy Group v. Kintetsu Enters. of Am., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775, 797-8 o 2 (Ct. App.
2005), review granted, 120 P.3d 1051 (Cal. 2005); Cohen v. Health Net of Cal., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 46, 56-
57 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 119 P.3d 956 (Cal. 2005); Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp., 28 Cal. Rptr.
3d 46, 49-52 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 117 P.3 d 475 (Cal. 2005); Thornton v. Career Training
Servs., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 727-31 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 115 P.3 d I21 (Cal. 2005); Lytwyn
v. Fry's Elects., Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 811-13 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, iio P.3d 1218 (Cal.
2005); Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 692-7oo (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, iio
P.3d 1217 (Cal. 2005).
46. See, e.g., Justin Scheck, Prop 64 Victory Makes Finding a Plaintiff Crucial, RECORDER, Nov. 5,
2004, at i (quoting both a plaintiff's attorney who stated that the initiative "changes a substantive legal
right, and may therefore not be applied retroactively," and a defense attorney who responded that he
"plan[s] to argue that Prop 64 changes a procedural right" and intends to argue that it applies
retroactively).
47. See Bob Egelko, Court to Decide When Lawsuit Limit Began, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2005, at Bi.
48. Tentative Statement of Decision, Twomey v. Hansen Info. Techs., No. 03AS03632 (Cal. Sup.
February 2007]
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Proposition 64 to a pending case, sustained a demurrer to a UCL claim
based on a failure to satisfy the more rigid standing requirements. 9
In late 2004 and early 2005, courts of appeal began hearing oral
argument on this issue." The First Appellate District was one of the first
to address the issue head-on in Californians for Disability Rights v.
Mervyn's, LLC, and it held that Proposition 64 did not apply to actions
pending at the time of its passage.' Within a month, the Second
Appellate District weighed in on the matter in Branick v. Downey
Savings & Loan Association, holding that Proposition 64 did apply to
pending matters.52 Days later, the Fourth Appellate District followed suit
with a similar ruling. 3
The California Supreme Court granted review in Californians for
Disability Rights and Branick soon thereafter, and halted resolution of all
other cases until it reached a decision in those matters. In order to
properly assess the issues that were presented to the Supreme Court, it is
necessary to examine the factual underpinnings of and judicial
determinations made in each action.
A. CALIFORNIANS FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS V. MERVYN'S, LLC
5 4
Plaintiffs in this action filed suit in 2002 against Mervyn's, solely
alleging UCL claims based on Mervyn's failure to provide disability
access in its department stores.55 The plaintiffs lost at trial and appealed
in early 2004. 6 While that appeal was pending, Proposition 64 was passed
and went into effect; Mervyn's moved to dismiss the appeal
approximately one month later. 7
In its opinion, the appellate court acknowledged that "the voters
found that the unfair competition laws were being 'misused,' and acted to
limit private enforcement actions under the UCL," and that the initiative
sought to limit standing by only permitting claims brought by persons
who had sustained an injury-in-fact and lost money or property resulting
from unfair competition. Despite that finding, the appellate court
rejected the contention that the initiative applied to the matter at hand,
Ct. Sacramento Nov. 10, 2004).
49. Lawrence Gornick et al., Playing Prop 64 Out: Changes to the Unfair Competition Law
Should be Applied Retroactively, RECORDER, Dec. i, 2004, at 4.
50. Id.
51. 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 303 (Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 138 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2006).
52. 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 408 (Ct. App. 2005), affd, 138 P.3d 214 (Cal. 2006).
53. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 698 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 11o P.3d
1217 (Cal. 2005).
54. Californians for Disability Rights, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 301.
55- Id. at 303.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 304.
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concluding that "[r]etroactive application of a statute ... should not be
embarked upon where, as here, there is no indication that retroactivity
was ever considered or intended by the voters."59
The appellate court predicated its holding on a few different
propositions. First, it recognized that "'a new statute is presumed to
operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity.
' 6 °
After reviewing the text of the initiative, it then rightly determined that
"the only fair conclusion is that the question of whether Proposition 64
applies to pending lawsuits was not presented to, nor considered by, the
electorate."' 6' The court discussed precedent involving a voter initiative
that amended a traditional common law rule (where the amendment did
not apply to pending cases), 6' and adopted that conclusion: "'the absence
of any express provision directing retroactive application strongly
supports prospective operation of the measure.
'' 6,
Part of the reason for the court's determination that Proposition 64
did not apply to an action pending at the time of its passage (and it is
worth noting that this was and is the only appellate court to have reached
such a holding) may be due in part to the fact that counsel for Mervyn's
did not frame its position properly. Unlike the UCL defendants before
other courts of appeal, Mervyn's simply argued that "a retroactive
application of Proposition 64 would further the initiative's intent to stop
misuse of the unfair competition law." 64 The court was disinclined to
accept such an argument, and the precedent against doing so is
unequivocal.6' With respect to the more appropriate claim that
Proposition 64 merely amended a statutory right, and that such rights can
be amended at will, however, the court declined to follow decisional law
which held that statutory rights were modified retroactively as of the
time of the amendment. 6 Another Court of Appeal summarized why the
holding in Californians for Disability Rights is so troubling:
That lawsuit involves an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment for the
defendant in an unfair competition law action. If the Court of Appeal
reverses the judgment and remands the matter for further proceedings,
the trial court will be faced with the prospect of potentially issuing
injunctive or restitutionary relief in favor of a party that lacks the
jurisdictional basis to maintain the underlying action.
59. Id. at 308-09 (citing Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 603 (Cal. 1988)).
6o. Id. at 304 (quoting Tapia v. Superior Court, 8o7 P.2d 434, 436 (Cal. I99I)).
61. Id. at 305.
62. Evangelatos, 753 P.zd at 585.
63. Californians for Disability Rights, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305 (quoting Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at
598).
64- Id. at 305.
65. See id. at 306.
66. Id.; see infra Part nI.A.
67. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 698 (Ct. App. 2oo5), review granted, 11O P.3d
February 2007]
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The California Supreme Court properly overturned Californians for
Disability Rights when it finally decided this issue in the summer of 2006.
B. BRANICK v. DOWNEY SAVINGS & LOAN AssoC1ATION6
Like Californians for Disability Rights, the action in Branick had
been disposed of at the trial court level and an appeal was pending when
Proposition 64 was passed.6 The plaintiffs' action was premised solely on
UCL and false advertising claims related to Downey's alleged improper
charging of real estate finance transaction fees.7' The plaintiffs were not
individually harmed by Downey's actions, and alleged that they brought
their claims "as a representative action on behalf of the general public."7'
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in
dismissing the action (on an unrelated issue regarding federal
preemption)." Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the briefing had
already been completed on the matter when Proposition 64 passed, the
Court of Appeal requested supplemental briefing on the matter of
"whether the amendments [of Proposition 64] apply to the present
case."73 Unlike the court in Californians for Disability Rights, which had
issued its opinion on the same day as oral argument in Branick,74 the
Branick court concluded that the presumption against retroactivity "does
not apply when a statutory enactment repeals a statute that provides a
purely statutory cause of action."75 The appellate court went on to
determine that the UCL was a statutory rather than common law right,
and thus the failure to address the issue of Proposition 64's application
should be interpreted as modifying the right immediately.76 The court of
appeal concluded that Proposition 64 applied to the case and that the
plaintiffs could not maintain the action unless they had actually suffered
an injury-in-fact and lost money or property due to the unfair
competition.'
Because the court in Branick held that the plaintiffs' action could
not continue as pled, it also addressed whether the plaintiffs could
"amend the complaint to substitute an affected plaintiff to preserve the
claims of the represented group." 8 The court concluded that it was the
1217 (Cal. 2005).
68. 24 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 406 (Ct. App. 2005), affd, 138 P.3d 214 (Cal. 2006).
69. See id. at 409, 413.
70. See id. at 409.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 410-I.
73. Id. at 43.
74. Id. at 414 n.7.
75. Id. at 414.
76. See id. at 415-16.
77. Id. at 417.
78. Id.
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policy of California courts to permit amendment when the named
plaintiffs can no longer maintain their claim, so long as the newly named
parties can actually step into the original plaintiffs' shoes without having
to present new facts or claims.79 Finding substitution to be within judicial
discretion, the Court of Appeal remanded to the trial court for a
determination of whether "the circumstances of this case warrant
granting leave to amend."'" The California Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed that decision on all grounds.8'
C. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS
On July 24, 2006, the California Supreme Court filed its opinions in
both Californians for Disability Rights82 and Branick,' reversing the
former and affirming the latter. In Californians for Disability Rights the
Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Werdegar, found that the new
law "properly governed the conduct of proceedings following the law's
enactment without changing the legal consequences of past conduct." 8
The Court found it most important that defendants be entitled to have
their rights assessed under laws governing liability as of the moment of
passage, and that this interest far outweighed that of protecting the
expectations of plaintiffs in these actions."s Following the analyses set
forth below, the Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeal's
decision. 86
In Branick, the Court unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeal's
finding that Proposition 64 applied to actions pending at the time of
passage. ' The Court adopted its analysis contained in Californians for
Disability Rights," and further held that the Court of Appeal's analysis
with respect to amendment of pleadings was correct.89 Following the
analysis set forth below, the Court agreed that the objectives of
Proposition 64 were not met by a ruling that barred the substitution of
plaintiffs who satisfied the updated standing requirements. 90  It
79. See id.
80. Id. at 418.
81. Branick v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 138 P.3 d 214, 220 (Cal. 2006).
82. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC, 138 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2006).
83. Branick, 138 P.3d at 214.
84. Californians for Disability Rights, 138 P.3d at 212.
85. See id. at 213 & n.5.
86. Id. at 213.
87. See Branick, 138 P.3d at 216, 220.
88. Id. at 216.
89. Id. at 216-18.
9
o . Id. at 218 ("[T]o bar a meritorious action prosecuted by a substituted plaintiff 'who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of' unfair competition or false
advertising serves none of the voters' articulated objectives." (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17204, 17535 (Deering 2oo6))).
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accordingly remanded that decision to the trial court.9'
III. UNDERLYING ISSUES TO BE ASSESSED IN DETERMINING WHETHER
PROPOSITION 64 APPLIES TO PENDING ACTIONS
There are three primary points of dispute as to whether Proposition
64 applies to pending matters. The first involves whether the UCL is a
statutory or constitutional right, which determines whether, in the face of
Proposition 64's silence, the amendments apply to pending actions. The
second involves whether the rights modified by Proposition 64 are
procedural or substantive; if procedural, they apply retroactively; if
substantive, they do not. Finally, there is the debate surrounding the
intent of the silent voters; some argue that the text of the amendment
implies that the voters intended for Proposition 64 to apply to pending
actions,9" while others assert that the statute's silence shows it does not.
There is in fact some difference in meaning when discussing whether
the amendments contained in Proposition 64 apply retroactively or to
pending actions. The true issue here is neither one of retroactivity nor
prospectivity. Instead, the issue is whether Proposition 64 applies to
pending actions. Thus, the amendment would not be said to apply
retroactively, but instead to terminate pending actions that do not meet
the standing or procedural requirements established by Proposition 64.9'
A. STATUTORY RIGHTS VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Typically, courts will construe statutes to operate prospectively. 4
Proponents of the position that Proposition 64 does not apply to pending
actions argue that this presumption of prospectivity is the only analysis
needed.95 In fact, the analysis depends on whether the right modified by
the amendment in question is statutory or constitutional in nature.
Where an action is based only on a statute, under which no constitutional
rights have vested, "'a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause
will terminate all pending actions based thereon."'
'
This is so for a number of reasons, including the fact that the
California Government Code explicitly states that parties who proceed to
litigate under a statutory right do so with full knowledge that the right
91. Id.
92. Shannon Z. Petersen, California Proposition 64 Requires that Pending Actions Based on the
Unfair Competition or False Advertising Laws Be Dismissed, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 73, 8o (2005).
93. For this reason, this Note refers to the amendment as applying to pending actions, though
many courts refer to the amendment as applying retroactively.
94. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist. v. Mann, 558 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1977).
95. See, e.g., Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 306 (Ct.
App. 205), rev'd, 138 P.3 d 207 (Cal. 2006).
96. Mann, 558 P.2d at 2 (quoting S. Serv. Co. v. Los Angeles, 97 P.2d 963, 970 (Cal. 1940)); see
also Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 493-94 (Ct. App. 2005).
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could become impaired or be eradicated by statutory repeal.97 Courts
have applied this maxim to pre-judgment proceedings in a variety of
contexts.9 At the same time, the traditional interpretation that silence
implies only prospectivity has been applied to modifications of
constitutional and common law rights.' One of the leading cases on this
matter in California, Evangelatos v. Superior Court, similarly involved a
ballot initiative that was silent with respect to its application, but the
ballot initiative in question modified the traditional common law
doctrine of joint and several liability.'"
The California Supreme Court's analysis in its decision in Wilcox v.
Same is largely analogous to the modifications to the UCL effectuated by
the passage of Proposition 64. ' I Wilcox concerned the repeal of a
provision of the state constitution that granted plaintiffs a statutory right
to sue under a non-common law theory of contract law.' 2 The repeal in
Wilcox was passed prior to the entry of final judgment,' 3 and the Court
held that the "privilege of bringing suit.., was withdrawn by the repeal
of the law granting it, and all pending litigation not prosecuted to final
judgment fell for want of authority to maintain it."' 4 The Court's
conclusion largely rested on the fact that the plaintiffs who had brought
suit prior to the amendment were acting pursuant to authority that the
legislature could take away at any time.0 5
More recent California cases have reached similar conclusions with
respect to the repeal of statutory, non-vested rights. In one action where
a defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion after the passage of
amendments to that statute, the court held that the motion could not
proceed under the prior legislation, in part because it accorded the
proper distinction between the repeal of a statutory right/remedy and the
retrospective/prospective application of a statute. With respect to
statutory claims, the court further held that, "the reviewing court must
dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is
rendered."'"
97. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9606 (Deering 2oo6).
98. See, e.g., Mann, 558 P.2d at 6-7; Weissbuch v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 1 16 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482-83
(Ct. App. 1974) (holding that where possession of marijuana was delisted as an offense prior to final
judgment, the individual charged for violation of such an offense must benefit from that amendment).
99. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 586-87 (Cal. 1988).
ioo. Id.
ioi. Willcox v. Edwards, 123 P. 276, 277 (Cal. 1912).
102. Id.
103. Id.
o4- Id. at 279.
1O5. Id.
io6. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 926, 927-33
(Ct. App. 2004).
107. Id. at 930.
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Accordingly, in contrast to silence in most legislative circumstances,
in this instance silence actually militates in favor of applying the
amendment to pending actions with respect to the repeal or amendment
of the statutory rights. Such a rule makes sense in that statutory rights
are derived from the legislature, and accordingly can be repealed by the
legislature at any time. Although entities vested with constitutional
authority issue such rights, the rights themselves are not constitutional.
Accordingly, they can be repealed or changed with little difficulty at any
time, thereby affecting the rights of parties under those statutes. As a
result, statutory rights are automatically assumed to be extinguished by
subsequent amending or repealing statutes unless the amendment in
question includes language that clearly indicates the legislature intended
otherwise.'8
Whether the rights conferred under the UCL are statutory in nature
or codified common law is debatable. In i933, the California legislature
modified a pre-existing statute and granted plaintiffs the right to sue on
behalf of the general public without requiring plaintiffs to satisfy
traditional standing requirements, such as having suffered an injury-in-
fact.'" Although California has always had permissive standing
requirements, this broad power to bring such actions cannot be found
within California common law, and it is atypical compared to most other
jurisdictions."' Thus, any argument that Proposition 64 abridges
constitutional or common law rights is wrong. The matter has already
been addressed by the courts, and they have concluded that the UCL is
not a common law right.
Having determined that Proposition 64 modified a statutory right, it
is necessary to look to the amendment itself to determine its application.
Proposition 64 contained none of the saving language necessary to
preserve litigants' rights to prosecute existing actions under the original
UCL. Moreover, it sufficiently altered the standing rights under the UCL
such that many actions currently pending could not be brought under the
now-effective law."' Thus, all pending actions that have not yet reached
final judgment must be evaluated under the new law. Because California
has codified the rule that all statutory rights are subject to repeal,"2 this
result must be correct.
In Californians for Disability Rights, the California Court of Appeal
failed to distinguish between statutory rights and rights found at common
io8. Myers v. Philip Morris Cos., 50 P.3d 751, 758 (Cal. 2002).
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1933) (current version at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ I7200-
17205 (Deering 2oo6)); see Petersen, supra note 92, at 77-78; discussion supra Part I.A.
io. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d lo86, IO97 (Cal. 1998); see also
supra note 27 and accompanying text..
i i i. See discussion supra Part I.B.
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9606 (Deering 2006).
[VOL. 58:623
WHEN SILENCE MEANS EVERYTHING
law.' 3 It instead found "a seeming conflict in canons of statutory
interpretation,"'".4 even though Evangelatos explicitly acknowledged that
its holding was limited to constitutional rights."5 Instead, the Californians
for Disability Rights court myopically focused on the discussion in
Evangelatos of the presumption of prospectivity as the controlling
principle. ' 6 By failing to properly distinguish between statutory rights
and rights found at common law, the court reached the wrong conclusion
and permitted the action to proceed under the pre-existing law although
it had not yet reached final judgment."7 No other California Court of
Appeal has reached that conclusion.
Other courts have properly distinguished between statutory and
common law rights and concluded that the rights at issue are statutory in
nature, and that the presumption in favor of prospectivity accordingly
does not apply (and the presumption in favor of retroactivity applies
instead)."8 A prospective interpretation of the statute could lead to
strange results, permitting parties lacking a jurisdictional basis for
recovery to obtain judgments in their favor. The passage of Proposition
64 was designed to curtail just that. As one court assessing the situation
described, "the electorate would consider such a circumstance to be an
absurd situation.""19
B. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
A statute is procedural when it "neither creates a new cause of
action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits ..... When
changes to statutes are procedural in nature, they are found to apply to
pending actions because they do not "change[ ] the legal effects of past
events ....' This is not a retrospective application but in fact a prospective
application: "[T]he effect of such statutes is actually prospective in nature
since they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future .... [I]t is
a misnomer to designate such statutes as having a retrospective effect ....
Rather than change the legal effect of past events, Proposition 64
merely modifies the requirements a plaintiff must satisfy prior to filing an
113. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2005),
rev'd, 138 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2006): see also Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 697 (Ct. App.
2005), review granted, i1O P.3d 1217 (Cal. 2005).
114. Californians for Disability Rights, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
15. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 586 (Cal. t988).
116. Californians for Disability Rights, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
ii9. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 698 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 1to P.3d
1217 (Cal. 2005).
120. Strauch v. Superior Court, I65 Cal. Rptr. 552, 554 (Ct. App. i98o).
121. Tapia v. Superior Court, 8o7 P.2d 434, 438 (Cal. i99').
122. Id. at 437.
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action under California's UCL. Standing requirements are codified in
California's Code of Civil Procedure, 3 and although courts have
cautioned that "it is the law's effect, not its form or label, which is
important,""..4 in this instance standing is in fact a procedural issue."5 As
addressed above, when a statutory right is repealed, the modification is
applied immediately.
Some plaintiffs have contended that Proposition 64 does not modify
or repeal an existing statutory right and instead adds substantive
requirements to the UCL.126 Such arguments must fail, however, because
it is clear that this is "a subsequently enacted specific statute [that]
directly conflicts with an earlier, more general provision,""..7 in which case
"it is settled that the subsequent legislation effects a limited repeal of the
former statute to the extent that the two are irreconcilable. ''", 8 The
amendments to the UCL contained within Proposition 64 alter the
standing requirements of the previous UCL, thereby creating a direct
conflict and a limited repeal of the former UCL in that respect. Such a
limited repeal of a statute applies immediately to all pending actions. '
Accordingly, the amendments contained in Proposition 64 are
procedural in nature, effecting the repeal of an earlier statute. Applying
the procedural modifications enacted by the voters in Proposition 64 to
the UCL does not limit or modify the effect of a party's previous conduct
(the keystone for determining that an amendment is substantive in
nature).'30 Instead, the procedural modifications effectuate a repeal of
the previous legislation. When viewed through the
procedural/substantive issue framework, the silence in Proposition 64
does not require that it apply retroactively, for procedural rights cannot
apply retroactively. Instead, the procedural modifications apply
immediately to all actions pending at the time of the amendment, and
thus those unable to satisfy the newly enacted procedural requirements
must fail.
C. INTENT OF THE VOTERS
A final argument proffered in support of finding that Proposition 64
123. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 367-389.5 (Deering 2006).
124. Tapia, 8o7 P.2d at 438.
125. See, e.g., Anthony v. Snyder, io Cal. Rptr. 3d 505, 512 (Ct. App. 2004) (addressing standing as
a procedural issue); Holt v. Booth, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 731 n.8 (Ct. App. I991) (finding standing to be
procedural, rather than substantive in nature); Kane v. Redevelopment Agency, 224 Cal. Rptr. 922,
923 (Ct. App. 1986) (addressing the procedural issues of standing).
126. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 695 (Ct. App. 2oo6), review granted, IIO P.3d
1217 (Cal. 2005).
127. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist. v. Mann, 558 P.2d i, 6 (Cal. 1977).
128. Id.
129. Benson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 694.
130. Tapia v. Superior Court, 8o7 P.2d 434, 438 (Cal. I991).
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should apply to pending actions is that the voters intended for the
amendments to apply immediately.'3' Courts and commentators alike
have not been receptive to this argument, and for good reason. The
primary problem with this contention has been addressed throughout
this Note: the initiative, findings, and declarations of purpose are silent
with respect to its application to pending matters. As the appellate court in
Californians for Disability Rights correctly stated, "When read as a
whole, the only fair conclusion is that the question of whether
Proposition 64 applies to pending lawsuits was not presented to, nor
considered by, the electorate..' 32 However, the language of Proposition
64 could be construed to cut against this argument in that it states "an
intention to prohibit the 'filing' of lawsuits by private parties uninjured
by the challenged business practice."'33
Furthermore, because of the strength of the other arguments in
support of applying Proposition 64 to pending matters, the intent of the
electorate is largely irrelevant. It is arguable that the intent supports
applying the amendments to pending matters because the findings and
declarations of Proposition 64 describe the problems that amending the
UCL are meant to solve, and that "[i]t is the intent of the California
voters in enacting this act to eliminate frivolous unfair competition
lawsuits."'34 However, too strong an inference is required to conclude
that the amendment is intended to apply to pending matters based
simply on its language. Some commentators urge that "[t]hese clear
statements of intent indicate that the electorate did not want to just stop
such lawsuits in the future, but to stop them now, before they can
continue to do damage."'35 Regardless, "[t]he only legislative intent
relevant ... would be a determination to save th[e] proceeding from the
ordinary effect of repeal."', 6 Thus, the electoral intent arguments in
support of finding Proposition 64 to apply to pending actions cannot be
relied upon to reach such a conclusion.
D. AMENDING PLEADINGS TO SATISFY PROPOSITION 64
A related issue that arises with respect to applying Proposition 64 to
131. See, e.g., Branick v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 413-14 (Ct. App. 2005),
affd, 138 P.3d 214 (Cal. 2oo6) ("Downey also argues that ... Proposition 64 applies to this case
because the language of the initiative and the amended statute shows that the voters intended the
initiative to apply to existing lawsuits."); Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 138 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2006) ("Mervyn's contends that a
retroactive application of Proposition 64 would further the initiative's intent to stop misuse of the
unfair competition law.").
132. 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305.
133. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
134. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 6, § I(d).
135. Petersen, supra note 92, at 80.
136. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 697-98 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted, i Io
P.3d 1217 (Cal. 2oo5).
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pending matters is whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to
amend the complaint in order to substitute in new parties who satisfy the
modified standing requirements. 37 The general trend among the courts of
appeal prior to the Supreme Court's decision was to grant parties leave
to amend."" There was some dispute, however, as to how permissive that
leave should be.
On the more restrictive side, the Court of Appeal in Benson v.
Kwikset Corporation held that it was fair to remand the action so that the
plaintiff could attempt to amend his complaint and satisfy the
requirements of the amended UCL.' 39 That court was unwilling, however,
to permit the plaintiff to substitute in another party who would satisfy
the standing requirements under Proposition 64 where the statute of
limitations would bar the filing of a new action.'4 ° The plaintiff sought
leave to substitute in new parties that would satisfy the standing
requirements and to have that cause of action satisfy the statute of
limitations by "relating back" to the date of the filing of the claim
(although the statute of limitations would have otherwise already run,
barring the claim).' 4' The court held that plaintiffs could not apply the
relation back doctrine with respect to substituting new parties in order to
overcome the expired statute of limitations.4 ' The relation back doctrine
only applies where the new claim involves the same injury.'43 The court
correctly reasoned that a new plaintiff who has suffered an injury-in-fact
would "amount to a substantial change in the action."'" Unlike
substitution cases where the plaintiff merely requests that a
representative party assume its causes of action, in this circumstance the
plaintiff would have to "allege and prove his or her own injury and loss
of money or property to maintain suit.' 45 Thus, where the statute of
limitations has run, some courts have narrowly concluded that a plaintiff
will only be entitled to amend its action so as to satisfy the amended
UCL standing requirements, and will not be permitted to substitute in
parties whose claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. ,
6
Other courts have held that substitution of parties should be
permitted even where new facts will be pled to satisfy the standing
137. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
138. Benson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 699; Branick v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406,
417 (Ct. App. 2005), affd, 138 P.3d 214 (Cal. 2006).
139. 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 700.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 699.
142. Id. at 699-700.
143. Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79,96 (Cal. 1999).
144. Benson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 699.
145. Id. at 700.
146. Id.
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requirements of the amended UCL.4 7 The appellate court in Branick
took a more expansive view and held that, "so long as the amendment
does not present an entirely new set of facts and the defendant is not
prejudiced," amendment was permissible.' a Although that court left it to
the trial court to determine whether granting the plaintiff leave to amend
would be appropriate, it nevertheless is clear that the Branick court took
a far more expansive view than the Benson court with respect to
amending pleadings to satisfy the amended UCL.
The California Supreme Court concurred with the broader view of
the Branick court in its opinion, finding it appropriate to allow a party to
amend its pleadings if the statutory requirements are satisfied.'49 The
Court concluded that the purpose of Proposition 64 is satisfied by
applying the initiative to pending actions, and that to permit parties to
amend their complaint does not hinder that purpose.'50 As discussed,
such a conclusion is fully in line with the applicable case law, and the
Court reached the right conclusion by permitting parties to amend where
the statutory requirements have been satisfied.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly the electorate, in enacting Proposition 64, sought to
curb the abuse of California's UCL by limiting the previously expansive
standing requirements to injuries-in-fact and by creating new procedural
safeguards to limit those actions. Despite this desire, it cannot be
inferred from the text of the initiative alone that the voters intended for
the proposition to apply to pending actions. As the California Supreme
Court discussed in Californians for Disability Rights, arguments
supporting such an application of intent must fail.'5
While the intent argument is weak, much remains to support the
conclusion that Proposition 64, by its own design, must apply to pending
actions and that those actions that do not conform to its requirements
must be dismissed. The strongest of these arguments is that Proposition
64 modifies a pre-existing statutory right. Citizens are on notice that such
statutory rights are subject to repeal at any time, and the repeal of such
statutory rights is effective immediately. It has been beyond dispute for
more than fifty years in California that the UCL is not an embodiment of
the common law, and thus it is a statutory right subject to this proviso. Its
147. See, e.g., Branick v. Downey Say. & Loan Ass'n, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 417-18 (Ct. App. 2005),
affd, 138 P.3d 214 (Cal. 2006).
148. Id. at 417.
149. Branick, 138 P.3d 214, 217-18.
150. Id. at 217.
i5. Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2005),
rev'd, 138 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2006).
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modification (which can be interpreted as a repeal due to the reduced
standing requirements) applied to pending actions the moment it became
effective.
Another, slightly weaker argument in support of finding that
Proposition 64 applies to pending actions is the fact that the initiative
affected a procedural rather than a substantive right. Standing
requirements have long been characterized as procedural, and that is
likely the case herein as well. Procedural modifications are effective
immediately, thus further buttressing the conclusion that Proposition 64,
by its own design, applies to pending actions.
Finally, with respect to whether plaintiffs should be entitled to
amend their pleadings or even substitute new plaintiffs, the California
Supreme Court's narrow holding in this respect was appropriate. To
allow plaintiffs to subvert California's longstanding relation back
principle to overcome statute of limitations problems would put
defendants in an untenable position, leaving them burdened with having
to defend actions on new facts and injuries that would be barred by the
statute of limitations if filed today. If a plaintiff's claim is within the
statute of limitations, it should be permitted to substitute new parties as
necessary so long as the facts remain somewhat similar. In the event that
the statute of limitations has run, however, courts should limit granting
leave to amend to those situations where the plaintiff remains in the case
but somehow manages to satisfy the standing requirements set forth in
Proposition 64.
The dispute in determining whether Proposition 64 applies to
pending actions thus does not boil down to the failure of its drafters to
specify when it applies. In fact, Proposition 64's silence, standing alone,
cuts against finding that it should apply to pending matters. Rather than
interpreting this silence, courts must instead look to the design of the
initiative and the law it amends in order to determine whether it applies
to pending actions. In this instance, such an examination reveals that
despite the silence on its face, Proposition 64 has plenty to say on the
matter.
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